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Abstract—We show how third-party web trackers can
deanonymize users of cryptocurrencies. We present two distinct
but complementary attacks. On most shopping websites, third
party trackers receive information about user purchases for
purposes of advertising and analytics. We show that, if the
user pays using a cryptocurrency, trackers typically possess
enough information about the purchase to uniquely identify the
transaction on the blockchain, link it to the user’s cookie, and
further to the user’s real identity. Our second attack shows that
if the tracker is able to link two purchases of the same user to the
blockchain in this manner, it can identify the user’s entire cluster
of addresses and transactions on the blockchain, even if the user
employs blockchain anonymity techniques such as CoinJoin. The
attacks are passive and hence can be retroactively applied to past
purchases. We discuss several mitigations, but none are perfect.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eight years after Bitcoin’s introduction, the ability to pay
online using cryptocurrencies is common: prominent mer-
chants such as Microsoft, Newegg, and Overstock support it.
Cryptocurrency users tend to value financial privacy, and it
is a major reason for choosing to pay with Bitcoin [1]. Yet,
websites including shopping sites are known to be rife with
third-party tracking [2]. In this paper, we study the impact of
online tracking on the privacy of Bitcoin users.
First, we show that online trackers are able to see sensitive
details of payment flows, such as the identities and prices
of items added to shopping carts. Crucially, in many cases
they receive sufficient information about a purchase to link
it uniquely to a transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain.1 This
core linkage can be expanded in both directions: based on
tracking cookies, the transaction can be linked to the user’s
activities across the web. And based on well-known Bitcoin
address clustering techniques [3], [4], it can be linked to their
other Bitcoin transactions.
This basic attack can be made worse in several ways. We
find that many merchant sites send even more information
to trackers, such as the transaction-specific Bitcoin address.
This acts as a high-entropy identifier and makes linking to the
blockchain trivial. We also show that many merchants addi-
tionally leak users’ PII (name, email address, etc.) to trackers,
allowing trackers to link not only users’ web profiles but also
blockchain transactions to their identities. Finally, malicious
trackers may use JavaScript to extract Bitcoin addresses or PII
1Throughout we study Bitcoin since it has the most support for online
payments, but our findings apply to many other cryptocurrencies.
from web pages even if it is not leaked to them by default.
We show that this is possible on the vast majority of merchant
sites.
Of course, Bitcoin does not guarantee unlinkability of
transactions. But while linking of a user’s Bitcoin addresses
with each other is well known [3]–[6], our attack shows how
to link addresses to external information, including identity.
The main defense against linkage attacks is mixing [7], [8].
The best known mixing technique is CoinJoin, in which users
send coins to each other in a way that hides the link between
their old and new coins. Our second main contribution is
showing the effectiveness of the cluster intersection attack,
a previously known attack against mixing. Specifically, we
show that a small amount of additional information, namely
that two (or more) transactions were made by the same
entity, is sufficient to undo the effect of mixing (see Figure
1). While such auxiliary information is available to many
potential entities — merchants, other counterparties such as
websites that accept donations, intermediaries such as payment
processors, and potentially network eavesdroppers — web
trackers are in the ideal position to carry out this attack.
Based on the above two attacks, we present the following
findings. We present a taxonomy of information leaks to
trackers on e-commerce websites. We focus on leaks that
allow linking a payment flow to a blockchain transaction. We
compiled a list of 130 online merchants that accept Bitcoin,
and analyzed their websites by extending the functionality of
the open-source OpenWPM web privacy measurement tool
[2]. We find that at least 53/130 of merchants leak payment
information to a total of at least 40 third parties, most
frequently from shopping cart pages. The vast majority of
these represent intentional sharing of purchase data with third
parties for advertising and analytics purposes. In addition, we
find that many merchant websites have far more serious (and
likely unintentional) information leaks that directly reveal the
exact transaction on the blockchain to dozens of trackers.
Turning to the Bitcoin blockchain, we use empirical mea-
surement to estimate the uniqueness of transactions as a
function of the adversary’s uncertainty about the transaction’s
timestamp and value (Section V). We find that unique linkage
is possible in over 60% of cases for realistic values of these pa-
rameters, and that in the vast majority of cases, the anonymity
set size is 5 or less. The attack degrades gracefully as the
adversary’s uncertainty increases. Note that in the case of the
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the full scope of our attack.
Consider three websites that happen to have the same embedded tracker. Alice makes purchases and pays with Bitcoin on the
first two sites, and logs in on the third. Merchant A leaks a QR code of the transaction’s Bitcoin address to the tracker, merchant
B leaks a purchase amount, and merchant C leaks Alice’s PII. Such leaks are commonplace today, and usually intentional
(Section IV). The tracker links these three purchases based on Alice’s browser cookie. Further, the tracker obtains enough
information to uniquely (or near-uniquely) identify coins on the Bitcoin blockchain that correspond to the two purchases.
However, Alice took the precaution of putting her bitcoins through CoinJoin before making purchases. Thus, either transaction
individually could not have been traced back to Alice’s wallet, but there is only one wallet that participated in both CoinJoins,
and is hence revealed to be Alice’s.
unintentional leaks mentioned above, there is no uncertainty,
and unique linkage is always possible.
Next, we evaluate the efficacy of the cluster intersection
attack against CoinJoin (Section VI; in Section VIII we discuss
the applicability to other types of mixing). By identifying
a corpus of 78,697 CoinJoin transactions on the Bitcoin
blockchain over a two-year period, we present realistic simu-
lations of a victim who mixes coins from her wallet and then
makes payment transactions that are observed by the adver-
sary. For example, if the victim employs 3 rounds of CoinJoin
and the adversary observes two of the victim’s payments, he
can link them back to her wallet (despite mixing) with 98%
accuracy. Multiple rounds of mixing increase privacy, but those
gains are quickly stripped away if the adversary observes more
than 2 payments.
Finally, we evaluate our attack end to end (Section VII). We
made 21 purchases on 20 merchant websites. For 11 of these
purchases, we used freshly mixed coins to attempt to deter
linkage. There were 25 pairs of purchases made with mixed
coins for which there was at least one tracker that received
leaked data about both purchases. We find that in 20 of these
25 cases, the tracker can identify the user’s wallet despite the
use of mixing.
Our attack highlights the dangers of pervasive web tracking:
Bitcoin is often used for sensitive activities, making the
compromise of Bitcoin privacy a far more serious threat than
targeted advertising. In Section VIII we discuss mitigations
that merchants can deploy. None is a complete solution, given
the fundamental tension between privacy and the analytics
needs of modern e-commerce. Indeed, most of the privacy-
breaching data flows we identify are intentional and not
accidental (Section IV).
The main self-defense available to users today is to use
tracking-protection tools such as Ghostery or uBlock Origin,
but we note several limitations. First, since our attack is pas-
sive, trackers have already accumulated data in their logs that
enable them to retrospectively carry out the attack. Second,
tracking protection tools aren’t perfect and contain both false
positives (resulting in broken functionality) and false negatives
(resulting in missed trackers). In Section IV we show that
even with tracking protection enabled, 25 merchants still leak
sensitive information to third parties. Third, merchants, pay-
ment processors, and even network eavesdroppers are potential
adversaries for some of the attacks we describe, and tracking
protection does not help against these adversaries. Finally, in
Section VIII we also discuss how our techniques can aid law
enforcement investigations.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Our work brings together two previously unrelated areas of
privacy research: web tracking and anonymity of cryptocur-
rencies. We describe each in turn.
Online tracking. Since the web’s inception, the number of
third parties that track and record user activity has exploded.
[9]–[12]. In this paper we use the terms third party and tracker
interchangeably. Some trackers have a substantial view of
users’ activities across the web: Google, for instance, has
a tracking presence on roughly 80% of sites [13]. Tracking
methods have also become more sophisticated over time [14]–
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[18]. The effectiveness of tracker-blocking tools has been
studied by various authors [19]–[21].
Some trackers like Google and Facebook are known to
tie their tracking profiles to identities directly disclosed by
users, but most trackers have no direct relationship with users.
However, even such trackers acquire PII, often accidentally.
Various studies starting in 2009 have shown that the leakage
of PII from first parties to third parties is rampant [22], [23],
and the problem remains severe today.
Most trackers are legitimate businesses, but are known to
use intrusive means to track users. These include misuse
of HTML5 APIs for fingerprinting, such as Canvas, Audio
Context, and Battery Status [2]; cross-device tracking [24];
workarounds to browser privacy features [25], and sniffing
data from unsubmitted forms [26]. Many trackers have poor
security on their servers and are a target for compromise for
malvertising and other purposes [27], [28].
The problem of trackers observing shopping and payment
flows is unlikely to go away. Consider retargeting, which is
the ability to serve ads to users for items they are known to
have shown an interest in purchasing. It is one of the most
valuable forms of advertising [29]. The farther into a payment
flow a tracker can observe a user (cart page, checkout page,
etc.) the greater the interest signaled. Another major benefit is
conversion tracking of ad campaigns. Having trackers on the
payment flows is needed to help analyze whether a user who
was served an ad actually follows through with a purchase.
Other applications include fraud/abuse detection and consumer
insights.
Cryptocurrencies. In Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies, users
pay by broadcasting transactions to a peer-to-peer network.
Transactions are signed statements authorizing transfers from
one address to another. Addresses are public keys that act as
pseudonymous “account” identifiers. Transactions are recorded
in an immutable, global ledger called the blockchain [30], [31].
Address clustering and mixing. It is trivial to generate new
Bitcoin addresses, and most wallet software takes advantage
of this feature to improve user privacy. In the normal course
of operation, users end up with coins split between numerous
addresses, and it may not be obvious which addresses belong
to the same user (or entity). However, there are well known
and well understood attacks to infer links between such
addresses [3]–[6]. These techniques have been improved upon
and implemented by companies such as Chainalysis and made
available via easily accessible APIs. Address clustering is not
perfect, but it is a powerful attack, and wallet addresses must
be considered clusterable unless additional privacy-protection
techniques are employed to break the link between those
addresses.
Many such privacy-protection techniques are known [32];
the ones readily deployable on existing Bitcoin-like cryptocur-
rencies are all variants of the idea of mixing. The best known
and most used technique is known as CoinJoin [8], [33], in
which different users coordinate in order to jointly create a
transaction that spends a coin of equal value from each of
them, and from which each of them receives a coin of the same
value. The order of outputs is randomly permuted so that the
mapping between inputs and outputs cannot be deduced from
the public blockchain. Services such as JoinMarket provide
the ability for users to coordinate to mix their coins [34].
CoinJoin improves unlinkability by breaking the multi-input
heuristic, one of the main heuristics used in address clustering.
However, the susceptibility of CoinJoin (and other mixing
techniques) to clustering has not yet been rigorously studied.
It is known that CoinJoin transactions are at least detectable
as such, since they involve many inputs and outputs with the
same value, a highly unlikely pattern in a regular payment
transaction. In other words, CoinJoin improves anonymity but
does not provide unobservability [34].
Intersection attacks date back to the communications
anonymity literature and are well known. Their applicability to
cryptocurrency mixing is also generally understood. At least
two papers mention it explicitly [35], [36], but they focus on
mix participants and other intermediaries as adversaries. A
2015 blog post also mentions the attack [37]. What’s new in
our work is the idea that auxiliary information to link different
mixed coins is readily available to web adversaries (as opposed
to behavioral patterns in earlier work, which is a much less
reliable linkage mechanism). Further, we are able to empiri-
cally evaluate the attack using recently proposed techniques
for identifying CoinJoin transactions on the blockchain [34]
(Section VI).
Other research on cryptocurrency privacy and forensics.
Gervais et al. present an intriguing attack on e-commerce pur-
chases using cryptocurrencies: since prices are denominated
in local currencies, and are usually close to integer multiples
of the unit of currency, blockchain transaction amounts could
reveal the currency and hence the location of the purchase [38].
Our work is complementary; their attack is stronger than ours
in that the adversary can be anyone examining the blockchain,
whereas our attack is stronger in the sense that much more
information is leaked, and not just the location.
Another major route to compromise of cryptocurrency pri-
vacy, orthogonal to ours, is the linkage of transactions to the
sender’s IP address. An adversary who is well connected to
the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network might be able to do so [39],
[40]; even users who connect to the Bitcoin network over Tor
are potentially vulnerable [41]. In response to these attacks,
Bitcoin Core changed the protocol for how transactions are
disseminated across the network in 2015. However, recent
work showed weaknesses in the updated protocol [42]–[44]. A
re-designed P2P networking protocol with strong anonymity
guarantees has been proposed [45], but not yet adopted by any
cryptocurrency.
In concurrent work, Portnoff et al. explore a technique
similar to our transaction linkage attack [46]. In their work,
linkage is a forensic technique to help identify entities behind
illegal activities (sex trafficking). It is enabled by a specific
feature of a specific website, backpage.com: classified ads paid
for by users are posted on the website along with an accurate
timestamp. This allows anyone (e.g., researchers, NGOs, law
enforcement) to link an ad to the transaction on the bitcoin
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blockchain that represents the payment for the ad. In our
work, linkage can be carried out only by specific entities,
such as trackers, but we extend the linkage via cookies, PII,
and blockchain analysis, none of which are applicable to the
setting of Portnoff et al. Of course, their work can be viewed
as a demonstration of a privacy breach affecting Backpage
users, including the majority not engaging in illegal activities;
similarly, our attack can be turned around into a forensic
technique (Section VIII).
III. THREAT MODEL AND ATTACKS
Merchant, payment processor, and trackers. A typical
cryptocurrency-based e-commerce flow consists of a user, a
merchant, a payment processor, and one or more trackers.
The merchant is the website where the user is shopping. Most
merchants make use of payment processors such as BitPay and
Coinbase to handle the details of processing cryptocurrencies.
When the user pays with Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency,
the transaction is received by the payment processor, who
then usually credits the merchant’s account with an equivalent
amount of dollars or other local currency. Trackers are “third
parties” on web pages, often invisible, that track users’ actions
for purposes of advertising, analytics and so on (Section II).
Doubleclick, Google Analytics, and Facebook are common
examples. Merchants, payment processors, and trackers are
all potential adversaries in our attack, although we are most
interested in the latter.
Information flows to third parties. Users take actions on
shopping sites such as logging in, viewing items, adding items
to their cart, checking out, and making a payment. See Figure
2 for an illustration of a typical payment flow on a merchant
site. The more of these actions a third party learns about, the
more feasible the attack. The types of information useful to
the third party are:
• Payment timestamp: the third party learns the approxi-
mate payment time simply by virtue of being embedded
on merchant website, especially on pages constituting the
checkout process. Checkout pages usually require the user
to complete payment (i.e., broadcast the cryptocurrency
transaction) within a short time window, typically 15
minutes. Trackers embedded on payment receipt pages
are in an even better position, as they learn the payment
time to within a few seconds. Note that assuming the user
included a reasonable transaction fee, payment processors
consider payments received as soon as the transaction is
broadcast to the peer-to-peer network and received by
the payment processor’s node. This involves a latency
of only a few seconds. The transaction may not be
confirmed until it is incorporated into the blockchain,
which may take tens of minutes depending on the degree
of confirmation that the payment processor requires. The
transaction confirmation time is largely irrelevant to our
attack.
• Payment address: the payment address is the destination
to send coins. Recipients (payment processors) will typ-
ically generate a fresh address specific to the transaction
— new Bitcoin addresses are trivial to generate. Although
there is no business reason for trackers to receive the
payment address, we find that this does happen often
(Section IV). Since payment addresses are unique, at least
within the time scale of interest to us, a leak of the
payment address trivially allows the tracker to link the
web user to the blockchain transaction.
• Price: Depending on the merchant website, trackers may
be able to see the prices of items viewed by users,
items added to the cart, or even the final price after
shipping and taxes have been calculated. Note that these
prices are almost always denominated in USD, EUR, or
another fiat currency, even on websites that only accept
cryptocurrencies as payment, due to the extreme volatility
of cryptocurrency exchange rates. However, once the
user checks out, the amount is calculated in BTC (or
another cryptocurrency) based on the exchange rate at
that instant. In some cases, this BTC-denominated price
is also revealed to the tracker, which is more useful for
linking than the price before applying the conversion.
• Personally Identifiable Information (PII): By PII we mean
any information related to the user’s real identity or
account on the merchant website, such as name, email
address, username, and shipping address. Trackers’ access
to PII exacerbates the attack. In this paper we analyze
leaks of PII from merchant websites to trackers, but we
emphasize that since trackers are widely present on the
web, the link to PII can be acquired on any website
whatsoever. Leaks of PII to trackers are known to be
rampant across the web (Section II).
In our measurements in Section IV, we focus on passive
attacks where trackers obtain this information in the normal
course of operation. Except for (some) PII leaks, most other
information flows to trackers are intentional: trackers use this
information for advertising and analytics purposes. However,
we note that in many cases, tracking scripts are in a position
to carry out an active attack and extract all of the above
information from web pages even if they don’t obtain it
passively. This is because third-party scripts are typically
embedded without any isolation, in a way that gives them
full access to the content on the page. Sandboxing techniques
such as iframes are readily available, but only infrequently
employed since they interfere with some of the functionality
provided by trackers.
Attack 1: single transaction linkage. In this attack, the
adversary (tracker) seeks to link a web user (as identified
by the user’s cookie or PII) to a transaction on the cryp-
tocurrency blockchain. The merchant and payment processor
are not interesting adversaries for this attack, because it is
unsurprising that they can carry out this linkage (but see
Section IV-C). We assume that the user is aware of this
possibility, and potentially takes necessary precautions, such as
mixing to unlink the transaction on the blockchain from her
other blockchain transactions and addresses. Attack 2 seeks
to overcome such defenses. But the tracker’s ability to link
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Fig. 2. An illustration of a typical payment flow on a merchant site. Each step of this flow presents opportunities for leaking transaction-relevant
information to embedded third-party trackers.
to even a single transaction is a privacy breach, because the
user has no business relationship with the tracker and many
users are in fact unaware of the existence of trackers (or at
least their prevalence and sophistication). It is also worrisome
because trackers compile profiles of users’ activities across the
web.
If the tracker has access to the receiving address, it trivially
enables linkage, as noted above. The more interesting case is
when the tracker knows the approximate price and time. Then
the tracker’s task is to search the logs of transactions that were
broadcast to the peer-to-peer network to identify those that fall
within the window of uncertainty both in terms of transaction
value and time. To quantify the tracker’s success, then, we
must model the uncertainty in the tracker’s knowledge of price
and time.
• Price uncertainty: The tracker’s uncertainty around price
arises primarily from shipping. If the tracker knows the
adversary’s location (either based on a leak of PII or
based on IP address), this uncertainty can be minimized,
although there might still be a small number of possible
values of the shipping fee based on the shipping speed
selected by the user.
• Exchange rate uncertainty: The second source of uncer-
tainty is the exchange rate: the tracker usually sees prices
denominated in USD (or another fiat currency) and not in
BTC. Most payment processors use exchange rates based
on trading data publicly released by an exchange, which
means the tracker can always reconstruct the exchange
rate at any given point in the past. However, since trades
happen several times per second, the exchange rate varies
rapidly and hence some uncertainty will still remain.
• Payment time uncertainty: this arises because of the
gap between the user checking out, the user’s wallet
broadcasting the transaction, and that broadcast being
recorded by the adversary or another node. The adversary
may run his own peer-to-peer Bitcoin node, or may
simply obtain the transaction broadcast timestamp from
publicly available sources such as blockchain.info. If the
tracker is present on the transaction receipt page, then the
latency is minimized, and is of the order of the network
propagation delay, i.e., a few seconds.
Attack 2: Cluster intersection. This is a complementary
attack where the adversary aims to identify the cluster of
addresses in the victim’s Bitcoin wallet. Recall from Section
II that wallets can (and do) easily create numerous addresses,
but in the normal course of operation these addresses can still
be linked together via various heuristics. Mixing techniques
such as CoinJoin are thought to protect against such linkage,
although this has not yet been studied rigorously. We assume
that the victim uses a desktop (local) wallet rather than an
online wallet provider. Privacy-conscious users tend not to
use online wallets, since that would allow the wallet provider
to trivially track all of the user’s activities. We also assume
that the user employs effective communications anonymity
techniques to mask the IP addresses of their wallet, as that is
a well-known way for anonymity to be compromised (Section
II).
In our attack, the victim interacts with the adversary multi-
ple times. The adversary could be a merchant, payment pro-
cessor, or (especially) a tracker who only indirectly observes
the victim. Knowing that the adversary might learn one of his
addresses, the victim employs mixing to prevent the adversary
from learning the rest of his addresses and transactions. He
doesn’t spend coins directly from his wallet, but only after
first mixing them. In Figure 1, after the victim has shopped
on merchantA.com the adversary is unable to determine which
of the three wallet clusters belongs to the victim. But after a
second interaction with the same victim on merchantB.com,
the adversary simply finds the intersection of the two sets of
clusters, which leads him to a unique cluster.
Web trackers passively observe users’ web purchases and
are able to link them together, via cookies or device fin-
gerprinting, even if the merchant and payment processor are
different in every case. Thus, this attack is complementary to
Attack 1, and would take as input two blockchain transactions
identified via Attack 1. Note that even if Attack 1 is imperfect,
and returns a set of transactions instead of a single one, Attack
2 will still succeed. The intersection size rapidly decreases as
a function of the number of observations, and even if two
observations aren’t sufficient to uniquely identify the wallet,
it is likely that a small number of additional observations will
suffice. We quantify this in Section VI.
IV. WEB MEASUREMENT: LEAKS OF SENSITIVE DATA
In this section we analyze leaks of sensitive data on mer-
chant sites. In sections V and VII we examine how trackers
can actually use this data to identify transactions on the
blockchain. We also show in this section how trackers can
connect this information to users’ identities.
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A. Method
To identify leaks of sensitive data, we performed a web
crawl of popular merchants that accept Bitcoin. To create a list
of merchant sites, we began by combining popular community-
maintained lists of merchants [47], [48], which gave us 1438
sites. We then pruned the list to those domains that were
found in the Alexa top 1 million websites, which left 283
sites. As we crawled the sites, we discovered that about half
of the merchants no longer accepted Bitcoin. This left 130
merchants in our crawl that accepted Bitcoin at the time of
our measurements, and we focus on these 130 sites. These
merchants were geographically distributed over 21 countries,
with 64 based in the United States and 20 based in the United
Kingdom.
Typical merchant payment flows allow us to complete most
of the steps — viewing products, adding them to the cart,
initiating checkout, and receiving a payment address and price
— before actually having to make a payment. This allowed us
to collect data on almost the entire payment flow on a large
number of websites. However, to analyze payment receipt
pages, we need to actually make purchases. Thus we analyze
transaction receipt pages on a smaller scale based on actual
purchases. We made purchases from 20 distinct merchants in
total.
To collect data on web tracking we used a modified version
of the open-source web privacy measurement tool OpenWPM
[2]. Using the tool we collected all HTTP(S) requests and
responses. We also manually marked any PII and payment-
related information that we encountered on the pages we
visited; we added functionality to the tool to automatically
record this information when marked.
Throughout our measurements, we are interested in the
privacy risk both for a regular user and for a user who employs
tracking-protection tools. Most such tools (e.g., Adblock Plus,
uBlock Origin) use standard, community-maintained filter
lists: EasyList and EasyPrivacy. To measure the privacy-risk
for users of tracking protection lists, we simply re-run our
analysis after deleting those third-party URLs in our crawl
databases that appear in the lists.
B. Findings
Based on our measurements of 130 Bitcoin-accepting
merchants, we found numerous third parties that receive
transaction-relevant information by virtue of their business
relationship with the merchant in the normal course of a
transaction. We define transaction-relevant information as any
information that could help identify the transaction on the
blockchain. These potential adversaries could retroactively
perform the transaction-linkage attack using data already
present in their HTTP logs or databases. We measure in-
formation received through either unintentional leakage, via
the referer field of an HTTP GET or POST request [23], or
through intentional information sharing via an HTTP POST
action or a GET URL parameter.
BitPay 70
Coinbase 24
Coinpayments 3
Stripe 2
Other 31
Total 130
TABLE I
PREVALENCE OF PAYMENT PROCESSOR IN 130-SITE CRAWL
Info type w/o protection w/ protection
Non-BTC-denominated price,
incl. shipping 24 12
Non-BTC-denominated price,
pre-shipping 23 5
Non-BTC-denominated price,
either 43 16
Bitcoin address 12 12
Bitcoin price 11 9
Bitcoin address or price 17 15
Add-to-cart events 28 2
Total merchants sharing
info 53 25
TABLE II
NUMBER OF MERCHANT SITES SENDING TRANSACTION-RELEVANT
INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTIES, WITH OR WITHOUT TRACKING
PROTECTION
1) Third parties that receive Bitcoin address or BTC-
denominated price: Almost all merchants use third-party pay-
ment processors; this helps them avoid the security, volatility,
and legal risks of receiving and holding bitcoins. Table I lists
the prevalence of different payment processors in our crawl
of bitcoin-accepting merchants. The payment processor either
sits in an iframe on the checkout page, or on a separate page
in the payment flow. The frame or page will display the exact
Bitcoin amount the user should send, to an address controlled
by the payment processor.
We found that 17 of the 130 Bitcoin-accepting merchant
websites send the receiving Bitcoin address or BTC-
denominated price to a third party (Table II). With this
information, linking the payment to the blockchain is trivial.
The leaks were found on less-popular payment processors and
websites that implement their own Bitcoin payment process-
ing.
We can also break it down by third parties instead of
merchants: see Table III. In both tables, we also present the
corresponding measurements for users of tracking-protection
tools (via the EasyList and EasyPrivacy2 filter lists). Those re-
sults are presented in the “with protection” columns. Table VI
in Appendix B lists the third parties that receive transaction-
relevant information despite the use of tracking protection.
On 11 out of the 12 websites that leak the Bitcoin address,
the leaks were to third-party services that render QR codes
to facilitate payment. Providing a QR code encoding the
payment recipient’s Bitcoin address and the Bitcoin price
makes payment easier for the user. QR-code generator services
generally work by accepting a GET request with the data
encoded as a query parameter, and returning the rendered
2https://easylist.to/
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Info type w/o protection w/ protection
Non-BTC-denominated price,
incl. shipping 29 11
Non-BTC-denominated price,
pre-shipping 18 3
Non-BTC-denominated price,
either 38 13
Bitcoin address 5 4
Bitcoin price 4 2
Bitcoin address or price 9 6
Add-to-cart events 9 2
Total third parties receiving
info 40 13
TABLE III
NUMBER OF THIRD PARTIES RECEIVING TRANSACTION-RELEVANT
INFORMATION, WITH OR WITHOUT TRACKING PROTECTION
QR code image. Thus, transaction-relevant information is
contained in the GET request (e.g., https://blockchain.info/
qr?data=bitcoin://[address]?amount=[price]&size=180). If the
QR-code generator service stores HTTP requests in their logs
they will have passively collected sufficient information to
perform the blockchain analysis attack. We saw three domains
providing this service: chart.googleapis.com, qrserver.com,
and blockchain.info. Three payment processors in particular
use chart.googleapis.com to generate QR codes: coingate.com,
litepaid.com, gourl.io.3
We made purchases on a subset of 20 merchants websites,
which allowed us to examine trackers on payment receipt
pages. Table IX in Appendix B presents the number of third
parties found on each merchant’s payment receipt page, and
the number of third parties that also receive transaction-
relevant information in the course of the payment flow. Em-
bedded third parties are common on receipt pages: in total,
there were 245 third parties on the 20 merchant receipt
pages we visited.
We found further serious leaks of sensitive information on
some of these pages. In particular, the payment processor
Coinbase redirects to receipt page URL on the merchant web-
site (such as https://www.overstock.com/bitcoinprocessed/?...),
and appends to this merchant URL a long string of query
parameters that include the Bitcoin payment address. If the
resulting payment receipt page embeds third parties, then
the merchant will (likely inadvertently) leak the payment
address via the HTTP referer header. We found this to be
the case on multiple merchant websites that use Coinbase.
The overstock.com receipt page alone leaked the payment
address to 42 distinct third parties via this referer leakage.
Additionally, we found that many merchant websites leak
payment processor invoice page URLs to third parties. This is
a different type of leak from the one in the previous paragraph.
The URLs themselves do not contain sensitive information,
but the contents of the invoice pages do, in the case of both
Coinbase and Bitpay. In both cases, the invoice page is not
protected by access control and the content can be viewed by
3Google’s policy is to retain these log for 2 weeks, for debugging and
development purposes [49]. We could not find the retention policies for the
other two service providers.
anyone who has the URL. Of the sites from which we made
purchases, 12 of the 20 merchants included leaks of these
URLs to a total of 25 third parties.
2) Third parties that receive non-BTC-denominated cart
prices: The cart page displays each product in a user’s shop-
ping cart, along with the non-BTC denominated (e.g., USD
or EUR denominated) subtotal of the cart. This subtotal will
often exclude taxes and shipping. The user is often directed
to enter their shipping address at the following checkout page,
which will then calculate the shipping fee and add it to the
cart subtotal.
From our crawl data we identify a second set of third
parties that receive the non-BTC-denominated cart price. If
the received cart price is missing shipping and handling,
it will increase the adversary’s uncertainty about the BTC-
denominated price (see Section V). As seen in Table II, 43
out of the 130 bitcoin-accepting merchants we visited send
some form of non-BTC-denominated cart price data to
third parties — many more than share BTC price or address
with third parties.
Based on the type of HTTP request that sent the transaction-
relevant information to a third-party, we can categorize
whether the sharing of data was intentional or unintentional.
We consider an unintentional data leakage a sharing of data
that happens solely via referer leakage. While it is possible
that the third party parses the referer for the price information
on the backend, we find it is useful to separate these cases
from an intentional sharing of data. An intentional share with
a third party means that the price was sent in the URL
of a GET request or the body of a POST request — in
that case, the request was intentionally constructed. In our
crawl, we found that the overwhelming majority of requests
that shared transaction-relevant data with a third party
were intentional: of the 312 requests we observed on 53
merchant sites sharing transaction-relevant information, 295
intentionally shared data.
To perform the cluster intersection attack, an adversary must
have transaction-relevant information for at least two separate
purchases. A third party positioned on more than one website
is in a better position to have the necessary data. Table VII in
Appendix B contains the prevalence of third parties receiving
transaction-relevant information that appeared on at least two
merchant sites. As one might expect, Google Analytics and
Facebook are pervasive.
3) Third parties receiving product page visits: At mini-
mum, on an e-commerce site a product page will display
the non-BTC denominated price of an item that a user can
purchase. A product page will also often embed resources
from many third-party domains. As an illustrative example, the
product page https://missionbelt.com/collections/solid-color-
40mm-belts/products/vader-40, includes resources from 31
distinct third-party domains.
Thus, third-party trackers could infer the user’s cart subtotal
based on the product pages they visit. In our data we found
several examples of third parties that not only see the product
pages a user visits, but know exactly when the user adds an
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item to their cart. In total, 28 bitcoin-accepting merchants
in our crawl shared add-to-cart events with third parties.
The most common third party to receive this information was
Facebook, which received add-to-cart events on 26 merchants’
sites. Being able to receive add-to-cart events is essentially
equivalent to being able to see pre-shipping cart prices. Only
two of those merchant sites send add-to-cart events to third
parties if the consumer uses browser tracking protection.
4) Third parties receiving transaction timing: As discussed
in Section V, an adversary needs to know the approximate
timing of a Bitcoin transaction in addition to its value. There
are several ways in which third parties already have this
information stored in logs.
As discussed earlier, when a user completes a Bitcoin trans-
action, the payment processor typically redirects the user back
to a receipt page. Any third parties loaded on the receipt page
who had previously seen transaction-relevant data can then use
the receipt page load-time as the approximate timestamp of the
bitcoin transaction (except during periods of anomalously high
network load). In our data, 245 distinct third-party domains
had resources loaded on merchant receipt pages on sites for
which we made a purchase. 16 out of 20 of those merchant
sites embedded on the receipt page at least one third
party which had previously received transaction-relevant
information. This knowledge makes blockchain linking much
easier. A more detailed breakdown of third parties by merchant
receipt page can be found in Table IX in Appendix B.
Even without seeing a bitcoin transaction receipt page, third
parties could still estimate the time a transaction took place
based on whether or not they know when a user starts the
checkout process. From our data we measured the extent
to which Facebook trackers, for instance, explicitly track a
user through their API’s “InitiateCheckout” event. The
Facebook InitiateCheckout event was found on 15 sites
of the 130 bitcoin-accepting merchants we visited in our crawl.
5) Third parties receiving PII: A leak of transaction-
relevant information coinciding with a leak of PII allows the
adversary to attach a real world identity to a Bitcoin address.
In our crawl, 49 bitcoin-accepting merchants leak some
form of PII to a total of 137 third parties. Table IV lists
the number of merchants that share each type of PII with a
third party. Table VIII in Appendix B lists the number of third
parties receiving each type of PII.
We also found that 21 third parties that receive PII also
receive transaction-relevant information. Those third parties
can conduct the blockchain analysis attack and add a label to
the resulting cluster.
C. Other adversaries
Some entities do not yet collect the necessary information
to conduct the blockchain attack, but could be in the position
to collect the information through an active attack.
1) Active attacks by third parties: Third-party JavaScript
has access to the complete DOM of whatever frame the script
is embedded in: if that frame contains a piece of transaction-
PII type w/o protection w/ protection
email 32 25
firstname 27 20
lastname 25 19
username 15 12
address 13 9
name 11 4
phone 10 4
company 5 4
Merchants
sharing PII 49 38
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF MERCHANTS SHARING EACH TYPE OF PII, WITH OR
WITHOUT TRACKING PROTECTION
Bitcoin address 31
Non-BTC-denominated price 104
Bitcoin price 30
Total sites leaking transaction-relevant info 107
TABLE V
ACTIVE ATTACKS: NUMBER OF MERCHANTS THAT ALLOW THIRD-PARTY
SCRIPT ACCESS TO TRANSACTION-RELEVANT INFORMATION
relevant data, then a script that turned malicious could go out
of its way to collect the data if it wasn’t already collecting it.
OpenWPM allows us to match third-party scripts to the
pieces of information they can read. In short, 107 sites in
our crawl grant third-party scripts access to transaction-
relevant information (Table V). The most-prevalent third
party by far is google-analytics.com, which appears to be
widely trusted: for example, a google-analytics.com script is
often the only script found on Coinbase’s payment processing
page.
Potential third-party access to PII was even more prevalent:
on the 130 bitcoin-accepting merchants we crawled, 125
merchants granted third-party scripts access to some form
of PII. This included the scripts of payment processors that
may not otherwise receive PII.
2) Network adversaries: While most of the merchants we
visited in our crawl use HTTPS, some failed to do so. In our
crawl, we found 36 merchants that did not use HTTPS for
crucial parts of the payment flow, including cart pages. A
network adversary could thus see the page load in cleartext,
and parse transaction-relevant information or PII from the
page.
3) Payment processors: While users are arguably aware
that payment processors will receive transaction-related infor-
mation in the course of a payment, they probably do not expect
that payment processors receive PII, since creating an account
with the payment processor is generally not required. Yet, we
found that at least 24 merchants share some form of PII
with BitPay, even though BitPay does not require that the
merchant send them PII.
4) Merchants: Conversely, users may expect that while
merchants necessarily receive PII, they may not be able to
easily identify the transaction on the blockchain. But we made
merchant accounts with BitPay and Coinbase, and found that
they both share the full details of the Bitcoin transaction with
the merchant.
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V. BLOCKCHAIN ANALYSIS: ESTIMATION OF LINKABILITY
Having shown that trackers obtain payment-related infor-
mation from online purchases, we now present empirical
analyses of the Bitcoin blockchain to show that trackers can
use this information to uniquely identify the transaction on the
blockchain. We reiterate that many trackers will have no need
for the techniques in this section since merchants share unique
transaction-specific information with them.
A. Blockchain analysis infrastructure and algorithms
First we describe our blockchain analysis tool, BlockSci,
and the algorithms that we used for the results reported
throughout the rest of this paper. We plan to release BlockSci
as open-source software.
Overview. BlockSci is an in-memory blockchain graph
database and query interface. A pre-processing step con-
verts Bitcoin’s blockchain and several other Bitcoin-like
blockchains into a uniform and optimized graph representa-
tion. BlockSci exposes a Jupyter notebook interface to the an-
alyst, and analyst queries are written in Python. The interface
is object-oriented for expressiveness, but the Transaction
objects are not instantiated in memory when the blockchain
is loaded. Instead, they are instantiated “just in time” when
accessed.
Features. We describe some features of BlockSci that are
relevant to the analyses reported in this paper.
• General graph queries: for example, we can conveniently
express queries of the form “find all transactions at a
distance ≤ d from transaction T in the graph.”
• Identifying CoinJoin transactions: The CoinJoin mixing
technique aims to provide unlinkability, but not unob-
servability. Identifying which transactions represent Coin-
Joins is a key part of our attacks. Our algorithm is adapted
from [34]; see Algorithm 3.
• Address clustering: There are well-known techniques for
identifying address clusters belonging to a single wallet
as long as mixing techniques are not used. We adapt
our clustering algorithm from [3], but linking addresses
connected by a CoinJoin transaction. This allows us to
avoid minimize positives. See Algorithm 1.
• P2P network data collection: Some transactions broad-
cast on the P2P network may never be included in the
blockchain (for example, if the transaction fee provided is
too low). BlockSci includes a network daemon that moni-
tors and logs all broadcast transactions. This information
is necessary for the adversary to minimize transaction
time uncertainty (Section III). Note that the adversary
doesn’t necessarily need to collect the data himself;
broadcast timestamps for all historical transactions are
available from public sources such as blockchain.info.
• Exchange rate data collection: BlockSci incorporates ex-
change rate data for various cryptocurrency / fiat currency
pairs of interest, and exposes them via the same interface.
This information is also necessary for the adversary in our
attacks.
• Support for altcoins: BlockSci supports a range of
blockchains, which are currently Bitcoin, Namecoin, Lite-
coin, and Dash. It is straightforward to support at least
the eight other Bitcoin-derived blockchains supported by
the custom parsing tool that we use. Blockchains with
complex scripts, notably Ethereum, are out of scope. Most
of our analyses in this paper were done on the Bitcoin
blockchain, but we do present an analysis for Litecoin
(Section V-C).
B. Method
We seek to answer the question: for a given level of price
uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty, and transaction time
uncertainty, what is the distribution of anonymity set sizes of
the transaction? The anonymity set contains candidate trans-
actions, one of which represents the actual payment. Based on
the anonymity set sizes, we also compute adversary success
probabilities. Throughout, we average our measurements over
a set of prices (obtained from actual sites, as described below),
and a set of random points in time over a two-year period from
mid-2015 to mid-2017.
Exchange rate data. Recall from Section II that payment
processors use price data from exchanges, which is also
available to adversaries. In our measurements, we use publicly
available historical data from BitStamp made available by
bitcoincharts.com.4 The data contains the prices of all trades
executed on the exchange, starting in September 2011. As of
June 2017 it contains 11.6 million trades. During the time
period of interest to us it contains about 4.4 million trades, or
about 4.2 trades per minute.
Sampling prices. To obtain a representative sample of
prices of user purchases, we sampled 100 item prices from
our dataset of merchants. We sampled merchants randomly
and then sampled items randomly from those listed on the
homepages of those merchant websites, ensuring a maximum
of 10 from any one merchant. When converted to USD, the
prices ranged from a minimum of 1.52 to a maximum of
359.00, with a mean of 51.27 and a median of 24.99.
Sampling actual prices is important, because the distribution
of values of e-commerce payments is different from that of
other transactions on the blockchain. For example, prices are
often close to integer multiples of the currency of account
(USD, EUR, etc.) [38]. Therefore, if we sample prices directly
from blockchain transactions, we might obtain unrepresenta-
tive results.
Sampling times. We pick 100 random timestamps from
our time period of interest. By picking these randomly instead
of periodically, we ensure that there are no patterns such as
specific times of day or day of week.
Modeling price uncertainty. As we showed in Section IV,
the adversary typically sees the USD (or other local currency)
price in the shopping cart, but only some trackers see the final
price after shipping and any taxes. By analyzing the behavior
of various merchants, we make the following key observation:
4https://api.bitcoincharts.com/v1/csv/
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Fig. 3. Anonymity set size of the single-transaction linkage attack that aims
to link a web transaction to the blockchain. Here the price uncertainty set
size is 5, the payment time uncertainty is 15 minutes, and the exchange rate
uncertainty is 5 minutes.
if the adversary knows only the country of the user’s shipping
address, there are only a small number of possible values
(typically fewer than 10) for the difference between the cart
price and the final price. For example, there are no instances
where each US state has a distinct shipping fee. Based on our
observations, the vast majority of merchants do not collect tax.
Note that often the shipping address is directly revealed to the
tracker (Section IV). Even otherwise, it is easy for trackers to
learn or infer the users country, whether based on IP address,
locale, or language. Thus, we model price uncertainty as a
small set of possible values. We sample these values from
the list of actual shipping rates on the merchant websites
we analyzed. We always include the value 0 in this sample,
because free shipping is (unsurprisingly) a popular option.
Modeling time uncertainty. The tracker may observe the
user take one or more of the following actions: view the
shopping cart, initiate checkout, and view the transaction
receipt page. In the first case, the tracker can guess that the user
may have initiated payment within a few minutes (of course,
this guess might be incorrect). In the second case, the tracker
knows that if the payment was made at all, it would have to be
within a time window set by the payment processor, typically
15 minutes. In the third case, the tracker knows the transaction
timestamp to within a few seconds (network latency).
Modeling exchange rate uncertainty. The exchange rate
data used by the payment processor is always available to
the adversary. However, there is potentially some uncertainty
introduced by the lag between the tracker observing the user
initiate the checkout process and the user being actually quoted
an exchange rate. We model the adversary’s uncertainty as
a time interval. If this window is 5 minutes, it means that
the exchange rate that was applied to the transaction could
take any value from the published time-series of exchange-
rate values during a 5-minute period that begins when the
adversary observed the user initiate checkout.
Modeling the victim and adversary. We simulate 10,000
payment flows based on all combinations of the 100 prices and
100 timestamps sampled as above. For each flow, we consider
two cases: the victim either does, or doesn’t, complete the
payment within the windows of uncertainty assumed by the
adversary.
We posit an adversary that behaves as follows:
• if there is exactly one transaction that falls within the
uncertainty intervals, output that transaction.
• if there is more than one such transaction, output a
random transaction from that set.
• if there are no such transactions, output “no such trans-
action”.
The last point is important, because in many cases the
adversary observes the user on the shopping cart page or the
checkout page, but does not know for sure that the payment
was made (some adversaries are also present on transaction
receipt pages and will have this additional information).
Quantifying success. We quantify the adversary’s success
in terms of two numbers: the true positive rate and the true
negative rate. A true positive occurs when the victim com-
pleted the transaction, and the adversary outputs the correct
transaction. A true negative occurs when the victim did not
complete the transaction, and the adversary correctly outputs
“no such transaction”.
For each simulated payment flow and each set of uncer-
tainty parameters, we search the log of broadcast transactions
(“mempool” log) for transactions that match the price and
time within the specified uncertainty windows. Any transac-
tions found, in addition to the payment itself, constitute the
anonymity set. Naturally, since the payments are simulated,
we do not expect to find them on the blockchain, but in a
real attack the payment would be part of the blockchain. In
other words, our measurements answer the question: “had a
payment of a given value been made at a given time, how many
transactions on the blockchain could it be confused with?” The
anonymity set size is 1 more than this value.
Additional heuristics. E-commerce payment transactions
have several other characteristics that enable the adversary
to distinguish them from (some) other transactions on the
blockchain. We incorporate several such heuristics in our
attack.
• Payments are always made to regular addresses rather
than high-security “multisignature” addresses. This is true
across almost all 130 merchants that we analyzed. The
use of multisignature addresses would make our attack far
stronger since the attacker, knowing the type of address
used by any given merchant, would be able to greatly
limit the set of candidate transactions on the blockchain.
• Payment transactions almost always have two outputs —
the recipient’s output and the change output — and never
more than two. This behavior is consistent across all but
one user wallet software that we are aware of; the excep-
tion is Samourai Wallet (https://samouraiwallet.com/).
• Fresh addresses are used, both for change and for the
recipient’s output. This is a conservative assumption; al-
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Fig. 4. Effect of price uncertainty on transaction
linkage
Fig. 5. Effect of payment time uncertainty on
transaction linkage
Fig. 6. Effect of exchange rate uncertainty on
transaction linkage
ternative behavior would make our attack stronger. If the
user’s wallet reuses addresses for change, that would undo
the effect of mixing. If the recipient reuses addresses,
it would make it easier for the adversary to associate
specific addresses with recipients, and thus further filter
the set of candidate transactions on the blockchain.
C. Results
Anonymity set size. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
anonymity set sizes under default values of various param-
eters: payment time uncertainty of 15 minutes, exchange rate
uncertainty of 5 minutes, and a price uncertainty set size of
5. The most common value of the anonymity set is 1, which
shows that the attack is powerful under this default set of
parameters. Based on the anonymity set size distribution, the
true positive rate is 76% and the true negative rate is 62%.
Impact of uncertainty. Having shown that the attack is
successful under a default set of parameters for uncertainty, we
examine the impact of each uncertainty parameter. In Figure
4 we see that the accuracy remains high even if there are
10 possible values for the price. As we observed earlier, price
uncertainty arises due to shipping options, and there are rarely
more than 10 possible values for it for any given country.
Similarly, the attack degrades gracefully when we increase
the adversary’s time uncertainty or exchange rate uncertainty
(Figure 5, Figure 6). Note that if the payment processor
automatically redirects to the payment receipt page, and the
adversary is embedded on this page, then the time uncertainty
is on the order of seconds, and the success rate is extremely
high.
More generally, the adversary will have a high success rate
if his uncertainty on at least one of the three dimensions is
low (Figures 4, 5, 6), as this greatly cuts down the number of
possible matching transactions.
Robustness of the results. While we took care to sample
prices from the actual distribution of prices on merchant
websites, we find that our results are robust in terms of
the sampling strategy. For example, we repeated our experi-
ments with prices sampled from the distribution of transaction
amounts on the blockchain (Figure 10 in Appendix C). The
results are very similar; the accuracy improves slightly. We
also repeated our experiments with all prices doubled, i.e.,
with each sampled price replaced by twice its value (Figure 11
in Appendix C). Again the results are essentially unchanged.
We also repeated our experiments on the Litecoin
blockchain instead of Bitcoin. Litecoin is the original altcoin
— the first fork of Bitcoin — and is the altcoin with the
most adoption for online payments, in terms of support by
merchants and payment processors. Again we find that the
success rate is high (Figure 12 in Appendix C); in fact, it
is higher than the success rate for Bitcoin, likely due to
Litecoin’s lower transaction volume, and therefore smaller
anonymity sets. Litecoin had a volume of 3,605,028 transac-
tions in the two-year period of interest, as opposed to Bitcoin’s
150,614,721.
Further improvements. So far, we have made conservative
assumptions about the adversary’s knowledge. The success of
the attack in practice may in fact be much higher, either due
to idiosyncratic behavior by payment processors or due to
additional information available to the adversary.
BitPay, one of the two main payment processors, rounds its
transaction amounts (in Satoshis) to a multiple of 100. Since
the adversary knows the identity of the payment processor,
whenever that processor is BitPay, he can eliminate a large
fraction of possible transactions — any transaction amount that
is not a multiple of 100 Satoshis can be eliminated. Applying
this heuristic, the accuracy improves substantially (Figure 13
in Appendix C).
Even if there is no discernible pattern in the transaction
amount, the adversary may be able to tell which (if any)
payment processor was involved in any given transaction on
the blockchain. Such address tagging heuristics are well known
[3], and are applied at scale by companies such as Chainalysis.
Tagging is not always accurate, but it can help the adversary
greatly decrease the anonymity set. This technique was used
for Bitcoin forensics in a recent paper [46].
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VI. THE CLUSTER INTERSECTION ATTACK
We now turn to our second attack, the cluster intersection
attack (Algorithm 2). To recap, the attack is applicable when
the adversary has auxiliary information revealing that two
(or more) transactions made with mixed coins trace back to
the same wallet (address cluster). Web trackers who observe
multiple purchases may have this information.
1: function EXPANDCLUSTER(addr)
2: C ← {addr}
3: for all tx in TXSFROM(a) do
4: if not ISMIXTX(tx) then
5: C ← C ∪ FROMADDRESSES(tx)
6: C ← C ∪ {CHANGEADDRESS(tx)}
7: for all tx in TXSTO(a) do
8: if not ISMIXTX(tx) and
9: CHANGEADDRESS(tx) = addr then
10: C ← C ∪ FROMADDRESSES(tx)
return C
Algorithm 1: Clustering. One step of the address cluster-
ing algorithm. We invoke this function recursively to find
all addresses associated with a given coin or address. The
algorithm incorporates the multi-input and change-address de-
tection heuristics from [3]. Bitcoin mixing today is dominated
by JoinMarket, so we use JoinMarket detection (Appendix A)
in place of IsMixTx.
Inputs:
• a set of mixed coins C known to be controlled by the
same user.
• an integer r, representing the adversary’s (possibly incor-
rect) assumption that the victim did at most r rounds of
mixing.
Output: a wallet cluster.
1) Identify all join transactions on the blockchain.
2) For each coin c ∈ C:
• Identify all coins x such that there is a directed path
from x to c of length at most r consisting only of
join transactions. Call this set of coins Xc.
• For each coin x ∈ Xc, identify the wallet cluster it
belongs to (Algorithm 1). Call the resulting set of
wallet clusters Wc.
3) Compute the intersection of wallet clusters:
⋂
c∈CWc.
4) If it results in a unique wallet cluster, output it. Other-
wise output “incorrect assumptions”.
Algorithm 2: Cluster Intersection Attack. Step 1 can be
amortized over multiple invocations of the algorithm; alter-
nately step 2 can be modified so that join detection can be
performed only as needed.
In this section, we present a large-scale simulation of the
effectiveness of this attack. An empirical validation, where we
de-anonymize our own wallets, is deferred to the next section.
A. Method
Identifying joins. First we identify existing CoinJoin trans-
actions on the Bitcoin blockchain. We focus on JoinMarket,
since it is (to our knowledge) the only decentralized mixing
service that is currently operating and has a usable level
of liquidity. We adapt Mo¨ser et al.’s algorithm to identify
JoinMarket transactions [34], and it is shown in Algorithm
3. We found 95,239 such transactions, of which 78,697 are
during the period of interest to us (mid 2015–mid 2017). The
number of coins mixed in one of these transactions has a mean
of 3.98 and a standard deviation of 1.72.
Simulating the victim. We consider a victim with a wal-
let of clusterable addresses who obtains 100 distinct mixed
coins over the two-year period of interest. We sample 100
timestamps (block heights) uniformly during this period; at
each of these times, the victim initiates mixing of a coin
from her wallet and completes r ≤ 5 rounds of mixing. 5
rounds represents a very high degree of anonymity based on
JoinMarket’s advice to users [50]. The victim retains the mixed
coins until the end of the period of interest. The values of these
coins don’t matter since this information is not used by our
deanonymization algorithm.
To simulate the mixing of one coin (with r rounds of
mixing) starting from a given timestamp (block height), we
sample from the JoinMarket transactions on the blockchain
that have this timestamp. With this node as the starting point
in the graph of JoinMarket transactions, we sample a path
of length r from among all such paths. If there are no such
paths, we repeat the procedure starting from a different initial
transaction.
Attack. At this point the victim has 100 mixed distinct
coins in her (simulated) wallet. Now we simulate the web
tracker’s view, that is, we simulate the victim making two
transactions in a way that reveal to the adversary that two
of these coins trace from the same wallet. Then we execute
the cluster intersection attack (Algorithm 2). We repeat the
procedure with different values of the number of rounds r
and the number of transactions t observed by the adversary.
B. Results
Figure 7 shows the adversary’s success rate as a function
of the number of rounds of mixing and the number of
transactions observed by the adversary. By construction of
the experiment, the cluster intersection attack has the same
true positive rate and true negative rate. Thus the graph also
represents the probability that, if the adversary’s assumptions
are incorrect about the number of rounds of mixing, it will
output “incorrect assumptions”. With one or two rounds of
mixing, just two observed transactions are sufficient for the
adversary to identify the wallet cluster. Even with four rounds
of mixing, a small number of observations is sufficient for
high accuracy.
Figure 8 helps explain why the attack succeeds: the success
rate is strongly dependent on the difference in age between the
different mixed coins. This is intuitive: if the victim mixed a
coin a year ago and another coin today, the anonymity sets
12
2 3 4 5
Transactions Observed
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
d
v
e
rs
a
ry
 S
u
cc
e
ss
Cluster Intersection Attack
3 Rounds
4 Rounds
5 Rounds
Fig. 7. Effect of the number of rounds of mixing on success rate of cluster
intersection attack. For r < 3 rounds, the success rate is 100%.
0 50 100 150 200
Time between tx's (days)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
d
v
e
rs
a
ry
 S
u
cc
e
ss
Cluster Intersection Attack
2 tx's
3 tx's
4 tx's
Fig. 8. Effect of age of mixed coins on success rate of cluster intersection
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age between coins known to the adversary to be associated with the same
user.
of the two coins are much less likely to intersect, compared
to two coins both mixed today. In other words, users who
have a long history of making e-commerce purchases using
mixed coins are at a greater risk of deanonymization, not just
because of the number of purchases but also because of the
gap between them.
VII. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF ATTACKS
In this section we describe how we validated our attacks
empirically by making actual purchases and participating in
CoinJoin transactions. Naturally, the scale of these experiments
was more limited than our previous measurements.
A. Setup.
We began by purchasing bitcoins from exchange service
Coinbase and routing it to a set of six addresses. We ensured
that these six addresses are clearly clusterable by our clustering
algorithm (Algorithm 1). This simulates a user with a wallet
containing addresses that are linkable to each other, before
employing mixing. As discussed in Section 2, we believe that
this is a conservative and realistic assumption. Furthermore,
the clusterability of the user’s wallet is affected by factors
not in the user’s control. For example, if a payment processor
provides a payment address that has been used before, rather
than a freshly generated address, then the user’s change
address will be linked to her wallet.
Next, we participated in JoinMarket CoinJoin transactions to
create 11 coins which are not linkable to the main cluster using
known techniques. We participated in one round of CoinJoin
for 6 of the transactions and two rounds of CoinJoin for the
other 5.
Finally, we made a set of 21 purchases on 20 merchant
sites. We sampled these sites from among those that leaked
transaction-relevant information to at least one tracker (as
measured in Section IV). For 11 of these purchases, we used
coins that had been mixed in the previous step, and we ensured
that these addresses as well as the change addresses for these
purchases did not get linked to our cluster. For the other 10
purchases, we used coins directly from our cluster. The final
prices of these items ranged from a minimum of 3.28 to a
maximum of 46.40 when converted to USD, with a mean of
13.67.
B. Validating transaction linkability.
We calculate the anonymity sets of these 21 transactions
based on our default values of the adversary’s uncertainty: a
5-minute exchange rate uncertainty and a 15-minute payment
time uncertainty. The uncertainty windows are centered around
the true values of the payment time and the exchange rate
determination time. As for price uncertainty, we use the actual
list of shipping options (and resulting list of final prices) that
we recorded while making purchases. The number of possible
pre-BTC prices is typically 5 or fewer per purchase. We find
that in 10 out of 21 cases (48%), the anonymity set size is 1
(Figure 9).
For 17 of the 21 purchases, there was at least one tracker
that received transaction-relevant information and was also
present on the payment receipt page, which means that for
these adversaries the payment time uncertainty is very low.
In this scenario, the anonymity set sizes are much lower: in
fact, it is 1 for 14 of 17 purchases. The adversary behaving as
described in Section VI would identify the correct transaction
90% of the time. The true negative rate is also high: 82%. This
means that if the adversary’s assumption about the payment
time was incorrect for whatever reason — if the P2P network
load is too high or the user’s wallet software included too low
a transaction fee, the receipt may not happen quickly — the
adversary will be able to correctly deduce this.
13
Fig. 9. Observed anonymity set sizes in empirical evaluation of the transaction
linkage attack
C. Validating the cluster intersection attack.
Next we validate the cluster intersection attack. Out of
the 11 purchases we made using mixed coins, we consider
adversaries that observe a random t of those purchases and
know which transaction on the blockchain corresponds to each
of them. We find that for t = 2, the adversary described in
Algorithm 2 has an 89% chance of correctly identifying our
wallet cluster, and for t = 3, this goes up to 99%.
If more rounds of mixing are used, the attack will not work
as well. On the other hand, we mixed all our coins during a
3-day period, and realistic users who mix coins over a period
of months or years will have worse privacy. In Section V we
evaluated the effect of these factors as well as the number of
transactions observed by the adversary. For our experiments
in this section, we limited the number of parameters because
of the expensive nature of the mixing market.
D. Validating the attack end-to-end.
The two attacks are especially powerful when combined.
Even if the single-transaction linkage doesn’t produce a unique
transaction, we can run cluster intersection starting from every
possible combination of the candidate transactions produced
by it. Most combinations will produce an intersection of
size zero, and can be discarded. If exactly one combination
produces one cluster and all the rest produce zero clusters,
then the adversary outputs that cluster.
From our purchase records, we determined that there were
11 trackers in a position to observe more than one purchase:
americanexpress.com, chatid.com, criteo.com, doubleclick.net,
facebook.com, google-analytics.com, google.com, mone-
tate.net, revjet.com, steelhousemedia.com, tealiumiq.com.
Overall there are 25 pairs of purchases for which there was
a tracker that could observe both purchases. We ran the end-
to-end attack on all 25 pairs, again using default values of
the adversary’s payment time uncertainty and exchange rate
uncertainty. We found that the attack succeeds in identifying
our wallet cluster in 20 cases.
Again, these numbers reflect conservative assumptions
about the adversary’s knowledge. If the Bitcoin transaction
details are directly leaked to the tracker, or if the tracker
is present on the receipt page, or observes more than two
payments, the success rate will be much higher. Similarly,
many Bitcoin users do not employ mixing. We do not know
what fraction of e-commerce purchases are made with mixed
coins, but we observe that only .05% of transactions on the
blockchain over the past two years are CoinJoin transactions. If
the user doesn’t employ mixing, then it will be straightforward
for the adversary to identify her wallet cluster, even with a high
degree of uncertainty in the payment amount and time.
VIII. MITIGATION AND DISCUSSION
Our findings are a reminder that systems without provable
(or at least well-defined) privacy properties may have infor-
mation leaks and privacy breaches in unexpected ways. When
multiple such systems interact, the leaks can be even more
subtle. For another example of the difficulty of composing
systems with complex privacy properties, see [41].
Cryptocurrency anonymity is a new research topic, but it
sits at the intersection of anonymous communication and data
anonymization, both well-established fields. Unfortunately,
it seems inherit the worst of these two worlds. Like data
anonymization (and unlike anonymous communication), sen-
sitive data must be publicly and permanently stored, avail-
able to any adversary, and de-anonymization may happen
retroactively. And like anonymous communication systems
(and unlike data anonymization), privacy depends on subtle in-
teractions arising from the behavior of users and applications.
Worse, realistic traces of the system may not be available at
the time of designing and implementing the privacy defenses.
Turning to defenses, we observe that our first attack exploits
the inherent tension between privacy and e-commerce, and our
second attack exploits the inherent tension between privacy
and the public nature of the blockchain. Thus, all mitigation
strategies come with tradeoffs. The available mitigations break
down into three categories: self-defense by users, techniques
that merchants can use, and alternative cryptocurrencies or
cryptocurrency-based payment methods.
Mitigation by merchants. There are a few straightforward
mitigations that merchants could deploy: (1) enabling HTTPS
on all shopping (and especially payment-related) pages — this
would protect against network adversaries, but not third-party
trackers, our main adversary of interest (2) generating Bitcoin-
address QR codes internally instead of outsourcing it to a third
party; (3) avoiding leaks of the Bitcoin address from payment
receipt pages; and (4) avoiding unintentional PII leaks. As
to the last point, however, note that the attack succeeds as
long as some first party website visited by the user leaks PII
to third parties, and at least some PII leakage is for cross-
device linking purposes [24], and thus intentional. Beyond
these obvious steps, merchants could share less data with third
parties, and with fewer of them, but this would come at the
expense of their advertising and analytics objectives.
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Self-defense. Web tracking is a well-known privacy threat,
and the main defense is to use browser extensions such as
uBlock Origin, Adblock Plus, or Ghostery to block trackers.
Such defenses can be quite effective, but they are far from
perfect [2], [20]. Our measurements in Section IV confirm
the partial effectiveness of these tools. Note that these tools
are of no help when the adversary is a network eavesdropper
(for either attack) or the payment processor (for the cluster
intersection attack).
On the cryptocurrency side, the main self-defense is to use
improved mixing techniques, especially multi-round mixing.
We showed in Section VI that this is effective (but not perfect)
as long as the adversary observes only 2 or 3 transactions. In
our end-to-end evaluation in Section VII, we carried out only 1
or 2 rounds of mixing, and this a limitation of our experiments.
Increasing the number of rounds comes at the expense of cost
(transaction fees and mixing fees) and convenience (due to
transaction confirmation time). A more through evaluation of
the trade-offs is a topic for future work.
While we have focused on CoinJoin or decentralized mix-
ing, in principle the cluster intersection attack should also work
against centralized mixes. If a mixing service introduces a
delay of (say) up to 6 blocks, then for a given coin that was
mixed at a given block height, all mix outputs produced in the
next 6 blocks can be considered part of its anonymity set. The
main complication is the extent to which mix transactions are
distinguishable from other transactions, which is likely highly
implementation-dependent. Of course, centralized mixing is
additionally vulnerable to the mix operator colluding with the
adversary or stealing the funds. Evaluating the attack against
centralized mixes (as well as other anonymity techniques
including TumbleBit [51]) is an avenue for future work.
Alternative cryptocurrencies and payment mechanisms.
Unlike the Bitcoin approach of anonymity as an overlay, other
cryptocurrencies bake privacy into the protocol, and promise
untraceability of transactions. The most well known of these
are Zcash, based on the Zerocash protocol [52], [53], and
Monero, based on the Cryptonote protocol [54]. Zcash is more
computationally expensive but comes with more rigorous se-
curity properties. Of the two, Monero has more vendor support
at the time of writing, but still far less than Bitcoin or even
Litecoin, and primarily on hidden-service sites merchandising
illicit goods. While some anonymity weaknesses have recently
been revealed in Monero [55], [56], we believe that it is not
susceptible to the cluster intersection attack.
The lightning network [57] is a proposal for a fast micro-
payments. It is a network of two-party bidirectional payment
channels. If Alice wants to pay Bob, she finds a path of
such channels that link her to Bob, through which she can
route the payment. Although the lightning network relies on
Bitcoin (or another underlying cryptocurrency) for its security,
the vast majority of transactions are off-chain. There is no
global ledger of all lightning payments, rendering our attack
ineffective. If and when the lightning network is deployed
on Bitcoin, it would be an effective defense. However, other
privacy concerns have been identified [58], [59], and the issues
that arise are analogous to communications anonymity [60].
Finally, like virtually all deanonymization attacks on cryp-
tocurrencies, our techniques could be used to build forensic
tools for law enforcement use. In past investigations, agents
have sought to find the identity behind specific blockchain
transactions that were known to represent thefts, funding of
unlawful activities, or earnings from unlawful activities, as in
the case of ransomware. Alternatively, agents may have an
identified person of interest and may wish to scrutinize their
cryptocurrency dealings for evidence of money laundering or
other financial crimes. Thus, both blockchain→ web and web
→ blockchain linking techniques are of potential interest to
law enforcement. Agents might subpoena a tracker or payment
processor for information that might allow such linkage, or
even use network surveillance techniques.
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APPENDIX
A. JoinMarket identification
CoinJoin transactions have a distinct structure, and JoinMar-
ket transactions especially so. Whether or not JoinMarket can
be modified to operate in a way that the transactions are not
as distinguishable from other transactions is an open question.
Here we describe our algorithm for identifying JoinMarket
transactions, and evaluate its effectiveness. We adapt the
algorithms from several previous works [34], [61]–[64].
1: function ISJOINMARKETTRANSACTION(tx)
2: if CONTAINSOPRETURN(tx) then
3: return false
4: p← d|OUTS(tx)|/2e
5: if p < 2 then
6: return false
7: v ← MOSTCOMMON(VAL(O) : O ∈ OUTS(tx))
8: if |{O ∈ OUTS(tx) | VAL(O) = v}| 6= p then
9: return false
10: A← {ADDR(x) : x ∈ INS(tx)}
11: V ← {}
12: for all a in A do
13: s← 0
14: for all I in INS(tx) do
15: if ADDR(I) = a then
16: s← s+ VAL(I)
17: V ← V ∪ {s}
18: q ← MAXFEE(v)
19: B ← Array of length p with all entries v − q
20: i← 0
21: for all O in OUTS(tx) do
22: if VAL(O)! = v then
23: B[i]← B[i] + VAL(O)
24: i← i+ 1
25: for all P in PARTITIONS(V ) do
26: t← 0
27: for all Si in P do
28: if
∑
Si ≥ Bi then
29: t← t+ 1
30: if t ≥ p then
31: return True
32: return False
Algorithm 3: JoinMarket Identification.
The algorithm is a series of heuristics to filter transactions
based on the following observations:
• Transactions should only contain spendable addresses
(lines 2–3)
• There must be at least two participants. If there are n
participants, there could be either 2n or 2n − 1 outputs
because JoinMarket has sweep transactions where the
taker obtains no change (lines 4–6)
• There must be an output of value v for each participant,
v being the mot common output value (lines 7–9)
• There must be enough inputs to cover all of the outputs
(lines 10–32). Specifically, for each change address, there
must be a distinct set of inputs that add up to at least the
output value v plus the change value minus the max fee
(q) that might have been paid to the liquidity providers.
For our calculations we set this to be the maximum of
.0001 satoshis or 1% of the CoinJoin output.
One limitation of this algorithm is that it is slow when
the number of inputs is large. This is unavoidable as the
problem is NP-complete (variable-sized bin-covering in the
unit supply model [65]). The listing shows a brute-force
implementation for simplicity; our actual implementation is
optimized, but nevertheless exponential. For our analyses, we
ran it on transactions with at most 17 inputs; it takes about
30 minutes to process 150 million transactions. Based on the
work of Mo¨ser et al., who don’t use this heuristic, the vast
majority — 92% — of JoinMarket transactions have no more
than 17 inputs.
When we run this algorithm on our two-year period of in-
terest (May 2015 – April 2017; block 354416–block 464269),
it results in 78,697 transactions. The algorithm has low false
negatives, and thus we regard this as a near-superset of
JoinMarket transactions for this period. The criteria used in
Algorithm 3 for filtering transactions are necessarily true of
all JoinMarket transactions, except for any transactions where
liquidity providers charged so high a fee that they were
rejected by our max-fee heuristic. But based on the empirical
analysis of [34], virtually all offers posted on the market by
makers have a fee that is significantly less than the threshold
we used. As a further sanity check, all CoinJoins that we
performed in our experiments (Section VII) are identified by
this algorithm.
CoinJoins and especially JoinMarket transactions tend to
connect to each other, and thus we can expect to find large
connected components among the identified transactions. In-
deed, among the 78,697 transactions, we find a single giant
component of size 60,187. We regard these as a near-subset of
CoinJoin transactions during this period. While it is possible
that non-CoinJoin transactions may sometimes accidentally
satisfy the criteria in Algorithm 3, it is unlikely that they will
cluster with the JoinMarket transactions.
The fact that our near-superset and our near-subset are
similar in size gives us further confidence in the method.
Depending on the application, one or the other version may be
more suitable. We make use of both versions in our analyses:
when simulating the victim, we use the near-subset, because
we want to have high confidence that the transactions we
use for simulation are indeed CoinJoins. When simulating the
adversary, we use the near-superset version because the cluster
intersection attack is more robust to false positives than false
negatives.
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B. Additional Tables
Third party domain
monkeykingcode.com
chatid.com
blockchain.info
google.com
revjet.com
qrserver.com
bootstrapcdn.com
americanexpress.com
schutzklick.de
chart.googleapis.com
nosto.com
gopollen.com
exponea.com
TABLE VI
LIST OF THIRD PARTIES THAT RECEIVE TRANSACTION-RELEVANT
INFORMATION DESPITE THE USE OF TRACKING PROTECTION
Third-party domain w/o protection w/ protection
google-analytics.com 27 0
facebook.com 16 0
doubleclick.net 8 0
google.com 8 8
chart.googleapis.com 8 8
segment.io 3 0
steelhousemedia.com 3 0
criteo.com 3 0
blockchain.info 3 3
hits.io 2 0
monetate.net 2 0
TABLE VII
PREVALENCE OF THIRD PARTIES RECEIVING TRANSACTION-RELEVANT
INFORMATION ON AT LEAST TWO WEBSITES, WITH OR WITHOUT
TRACKING PROTECTION
PII type w/o protection w/ protection
username 76 39
email 63 30
firstname 41 19
lastname 29 17
address 15 9
phone 13 7
name 7 4
company 5 3
Third parties
receiving PII 137 70
TABLE VIII
NUMBER OF THIRD PARTIES RECEIVING EACH TYPE OF PII, WITH OR
WITHOUT TRACKING PROTECTION
Merchant Receipt pagethird parties
Receipt page
TPs w/
tx-relevant info
adafruit.com 13 5
baronfig.com 35 7
digitalrev.com 20 9
fancy.com 0 0
giftoff.com 10 1
givemethedirt.com 33 5
health-
monthly.co.uk 19 1
jenshansen.com 59 7
newegg.com 46 22
opendime.com 5 5
overstock.com 42 42
petspyjamas.com 36 11
pi-supply.com 0 0
readytogosur-
vival.com 32 3
reddit.com 1 1
reeds.com 0 0
some-
thinggeeky.com 0 0
thepihut.com 44 8
thisisground.com 50 4
tightstore.com 32 4
Third parties
on receipt pages 245 88
TABLE IX
NUMBER OF THIRD PARTIES ON EACH MERCHANT’S PAYMENT RECEIPT
PAGE, AND THE NUMBER OF THOSE THIRD PARTIES THAT ALSO RECEIVED
TRANSACTION-RELEVANT INFORMATION
C. Additional Figures
Fig. 10. Effect of payment time uncertainty on success rate when prices are
sampled from the blockchain instead of from merchant websites. Compare to
Figure 5.
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Fig. 11. Effect of payment time uncertainty on success rate when prices are
doubled. Compare to Figure 5.
Fig. 12. Effect of payment time uncertainty on success rate when performed
on Litecoin. Compare to Figure 5.
Fig. 13. Effect of payment time uncertainty on success rate against Bitpay
transactions. Compare to Figure 5.
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